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COMMENTS
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES OVERRULED-SUPREME
COURT REJECTS TENTH AMENDMENT AS AN
AFFIRMATIVE LIMITATION ON CONGRESS' POWER
UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
DOROTHY LOWE BOARDMAN
I. INTRODUCTION
It is not easy to find a beginning for Garcia v. San Antonio Met-
ropolitan Transit Authority.1 The case was filed on November 21,
1979, but that date appears relatively late in the history of the is-
sue involved: Whether the minimum wage and overtime provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act 2 may be constitutionally applied
1. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982). Section 203 provides in part:
(d) "Employer" includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest
of an employer in relation to an employee and includes a public agency ....
(r) "Enterprise" means the related activities performed (either through unified
operation or common control) by any person or persons for a common business
purpose .... For purposes of this subsection, the activities performed by any
person or persons-
(2) in connection with the operation of a street, suburban or interurban
electric railway, or local trolley or motorbus carrier, if the rates and services
of such railway or carrier are subject to regulation by a State or local
agency (regardless of whether or not such railway or carrier is public or
private or operated for profit or not for profit), or
(3) in connection with the activities of a public agency,
shall be deemed to be activities performed for a business purpose.
(s) "Enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for com-
merce" means an enterprise which has employees engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce, or employees handling, selling, or otherwise
working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce
by any person, and which-
(1) ... is an enterprise whose annual gross volume of sales made or busi-
ness done is not less than $500,000 ....
. . . The employees of an enterprise which is a public agency shall for
purposes of this subsection be deemed to be employees engaged in com-
merce, or in the production of goods for commerce, or employees handling,
selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in
or produced for commerce.
Id. § 206(a) provides in part:
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to the employees of a publicly owned and operated mass transit
system. This question necessarily encompasses consideration of in-
tergovernmental immunity under the tenth amendment' and re-
consideration of recent Supreme Court decisions setting the pa-
rameters of that immunity.
The emergence of this issue can be traced to July 1937, a time
when large Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress were
successful in passing President Roosevelt's legislation to greatly
expand federal power under the commerce clause,4 only to have
those enactments struck down by an immovable, "reactionary" Su-
preme Court.5 Still riding high on the crest of his New Deal popu-
lism, President Roosevelt took a bold step. He decided to shift the
power of the aged jurists on the Court. The President proposed
that for every justice over the age of 70 an additional justice be
appointed; thus the workload of the Court's superannuated mem-
bers purportedly would have been eased. Through this "court
packing" plan, up to six new justices could have been appointed by
President Roosevelt, and the balance of judiciary power would
have been tilted in favor of New Deal measures. Congressional op-
position to the plan was immediate and intense and the bill was
rejected out of hand. However, as a result of the struggle, pending
legislation was saved.
The less intransigent among the justices, their robes still singed
Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any workweek is en-
gaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in
an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,
wages at the following rates ....
Id. § 207(a) provides in part:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ any
of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the produc-
tion of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce
or in the production of goods for commerce, for a workweek longer than forty
hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of
the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regu-
lar rate at which he is employed.
3. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
4. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8 provides in pertinent part:
The Congress shall have Power.. .To regulate Commerce... among the sev-
eral States... To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Consti-
tution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.
5. J. GARRATY, THE AMERICAN NATION SINCE 1865: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 325-
27 (1966).
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from battle, retreated on many issues, among them the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). This was to have been the final
major New Deal measure. It consolidated much of the early social
legislation of the National Recovery Act (NRA) and completed the
construction of the welfare state by giving form and substance to
amorphous social goals, such as the prohibition of child labor and
the implementation of minimum wage and maximum hour
standards.7
Controversy has surrounded the FLSA since its inception. The
original version of the Act excluded states and their political sub-
divisions from the definition of "employer" as used in the mini-
mum wage and overtime provisions.8 In 1966, a congressional
amendment extended the coverage of the FLSA and redefined
''employer" to include the operation of state-operated hospitals,
institutions, and schools.' The 1966 amendments did not provide
overtime pay protection to drivers, operators, and conductors ("op-
erating employees") employed by transit companies, public or pri-
vate. 10 Two years after their passage, the Supreme Court sustained
the constitutionality of the 1966 amendments in Maryland v.
Wirtz."
In 1974, the umbrella of the FLSA was extended to cover virtu-
ally all public agencies and their employees. 2 The 1974 amend-
ments, as applied to employees of state and municipal govern-
ments, were broadly challenged by the states and their political
subdivisions in National League of Cities v. Usery.' s In this
6. P. CONKIN, THE NEW DE.AL 101 (1967).
7. Id.
8. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982)).
9. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 102(b), 80 Stat.
830, 831 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1976)).
10. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 102, 80 Stat. 831
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1976)); see Brief for Secretary of Labor at 3-4,
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
11. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). The plaintiffs in Wirtz did not challenge the public transit em-
ployee provisions of the 1966 FLSA amendments, and their validity was not raised by the
Court. Maryland v. Wirtz, 269 F.Supp. 826, 827 (D. Md. 1967), aff'd, 392 U.S. 183 (1968),
overruled in 426 U.S. 833, 840 (1976).
12. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, §§ 6(a)(1), (4),
(5)(d), (5)(e), (6), 88 Stat. 55, 58-60 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), (r)(3),
(s)(5), (x) (1982)). The 1974 amendments to the FLSA also established a schedule for phas-
ing out the overtime pay exclusion as applied to operating employees. Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 21(b)(1)-(3), 88 Stat. 55, 68 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1976)).
13. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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ground-breaking decision, the Supreme Court overruled Wirtz and
invalidated the 1974 amendments "insofar as [they] operate[d] to
directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral opera-
tions in areas of traditional governmental functions."" However,
the opinion, couched sweepingly in terms of states-rights federal-
ism, failed to provide guidance for lower federal courts that had to
decide precisely when the FLSA was impinging upon essential
state functions. 15 To aid the lower courts, the Secretary of Labor
proposed regulations that would give notice of the Department's
determinations of which activities constituted traditional govern-
mental functions.1 6 The regulations were adopted and published as
an interpretive rule.1 7
On December 21, 1979, the Secretary of Labor determined that
"local mass transit systems" were not included among a state's
traditional functions.18 The inclusion of this category in the pro-
mulgation was prompted by a specific inquiry about the applicabil-
ity of the FLSA to employees of SAMTA dated September 17,
1979.19 The first suit of the Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority litigation was filed shortly thereafter on Novem-
14. Id. at 852. The plaintiffs in National League of Cities, like the plaintiffs in Wirtz,
did not challenge the public transit provisions of the 1974 FLSA amendments. Brief for
Secretary of Labor at 5, Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1005.
15. See Comment, When the Walls Come Tumbling Down: What Remains of National
League of Cities?, 53 CIN. L. REV. 625, 639 (1984). A clear example of the inherent difficulties
perceived by the lower federal courts with the National League of Cities' traditional func-
tions test was the treatment of National League of Cities on remand to the District Court
for Washington, D.C. The court was concerned that the state governments might err in their
application of the test, and therefore, incorporated into its declaratory judgment regulations
proposed by the Secretary of Labor providing for good faith immunity from double damages
under the FLSA and procedures whereby the Department of Labor would give notice of its
traditional function determinations. National League of Cities v. Marshall, 429 F. Supp. 703
(D.D.C. 1977); see 29 C.F.R. §§ 775.2, 775.3 (1984). The Department gave notice in 1979
that the following were not areas of traditional governmental functions: (1) alcoholic bever-
age stores; (2) off-track betting corporations; (3) local mass transit systems; (4) electric
power generation and distribution; (5) nongovernmental telephone and telegraph systems;
(6) fertilizer production; (7) farming for sale to consumers; and (8) boat engine repair for the
public. Id. § 775.3(b). The operation of railroads is a nontraditional function under National
League of Cities. Id. § 775.3(a). The following are traditional governmental functions: (1)
schools and hospitals; (2) fire and police protection; (3) sanitation; (4) public health; (5)
parks and recreation; and (6) libraries and museums. Id. § 775.4(a), (b).
16. 29 C.F.R. § 775 (1984).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. In response to the inquiry, the Secretary of Labor issued an official opinion applying
the FLSA to SAMTA employees. Op. Sec. of Labor WII-499 (September 17, 1979); see Ju-
risdictional Statement at 3-4, Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1005.
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ber 21, 1979.20
This Comment analyzes tenth amendment doctrine as it has
evolved from National League of Cities, through EEOC v. Wyo-
ming, to the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement in
Garcia. It also surveys the various schools of thought among con-
stitutional scholars concerning their interpretations of this doc-
trine. The Comment concludes that the return to traditional con-
stitutional principles in the area of congressional commerce clause
power, as directed by a majority of the Court in Garcia, may be
brief. Because that majority includes three Justices over the age of
seventy-five, who might be expected to choose retirement over con-
tinued service, the likelihood of vacancies arising on the Court in
the short term is not to be overlooked.2 The current administra-
tion unquestionably backs the minority's position in Garcia. Thus,
the longevity of this decision may hinge on the future makeup of
the Court, which, in turn, hinges on the federalism policies of both
the current and succeeding administrations.
II. National League of Cities v. Usery
In National League of Cities v. Usery,"3 the Supreme Court held
that Congress exceeded its power under the commerce clause by
enacting legislation that "displace[d] the States' freedom to struc-
ture integral operations in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions." 24 At issue was a challenge by several cities and states to the
validity of the 1974 amendments 5 to the FLSA.2 ' The Court was
divided bitterly on this issue. Justice Rehnquist wrote for the
Court and was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart, and
Justice Powell. Justice Blackmun joined the majority opinion and
also wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Brennan wrote a
stinging dissent, joined by Justices White and Marshall. Justice
Stevens wrote a separate dissent. The challenged FLSA amend-
ments extended statutory minimum wage, maximum hour, and
20. See Jurisdictional Statement at 3-4, Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1005.
21. 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983), rev'g 514 F. Supp. 595 (D. Wyo. 1981).
22. For a debate on the political ramifications of the President's power to appoint Su-
preme Court Justices, see Is the Supreme Court the President's Sole Preserve?, A.B.A. J.,
Aug. 1985, at 36. Because there are five Supreme Court Justices more than seventy-five
years of age, President Reagan has the potential to appoint more Justices than any Presi-
dent since Franklin D. Roosevelt.
23. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
24. Id. at 852.
25. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
26. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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overtime provisions to virtually all state and municipal employees.
The states argued that when Congress applied these provisions
across the board to state and municipal employees as well as to
private employees, it violated the tenth amendment."
Although the states conceded that the 1974 amendments to the
Act doubtlessly affected commerce and that they would be consti-
tutional as applied to private employers, the states maintained
that the tenth amendment stood as an affirmative limitation upon
Congress' power to apply the provisions to the states and their
subdivisions as employers. 28 The states argued that there were
other limitations upon Congress' otherwise plenary powers: An en-
actment within the authority of the commerce clause would be in-
validated if found to offend the sixth amendment's right to trial by
jury2' or the due process clause of the fifth amendment.30
Justice Rehnquist agreed that Congress' enumerated powers
could not be exercised to override state sovereignty:"'
We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sover-
eignty attaching to every state government which may not be im-
paired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative
grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the
Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority in that
manner.
32
The Court decided that a state's power to determine wage and
hour scales for its employees was an attribute of state sovereignty 3
and, moreover, a function essential to the state's separate and in-
dependent existence which could not be abrogated by Congress."'
In reaching its conclusion, the Court considered the substantial
costs imposed upon the states and their subdivisions." The result
of compliance, the states urged, would be the forced relinquish-
ment of important governmental activities such as affirmative ac-
27. 426 U.S. at 837.
28. Id. at 841.
29. Id. at 841 (citation omitted).
30. Id. (citation omitted).
31. Id. at 842.
32. Id. at 845.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 852.
35. Id. at 846. There was little agreement about the cost of compliance with the 1974
amendments. The Secretary argued that the states and cities' cost allegations were exagger-
ated and were based on misinterpretations of the Act, and that most cities would be unaf-
fected because they were already adhering to the federal minimum wage.
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tion, on-the-job training, and internship programs which generally
offer lower wages to trainees in consideration for vocational educa-
tion. 6 In response, the Secretary of Labor argued that the purpose
of the amended provisions was to provide a financial disincentive
for using employees beyond a work period Congress deemed appro-
priate and to spread employment by using additional employees to
do the overtime work.3 7
While not dismissing the considerable financial impact the appli-
cation of the amendments would have on cities and states, the
Court stated that such impact was not crucial to its decision.38 The
crux of the decision was that the imposition of the amendments on
the states and their political subdivisions would impermissibly in-
terfere with their integral governmental functions.39 Were Congress
allowed to alter or displace the state's ability to structure em-
ployer-employee relationships in such traditional areas as fire and
police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recrea-
tion, the majority could see little left of the states' separate and
independent existence. 40
Justice Blackmun heightened the ambiguity of an already con-
fusing opinion by interpreting the Court's decision as "advocating
a balancing approach in which the burden a federal regulation im-
poses upon a state and the extent of interference with state auton-
omy is weighed ad hoc against the magnitude of the federal inter-
est and the need for state compliance. '41 Justice Blackmun went
on to say that, in his understanding, this approach would not out-
law federal power in areas such as environmental protection where
superior federal interest demanded state compliance.42
36. Id. at 847-48.
37. Id. at 849.
38. Id. at 851. Justice Brennan commended the majority's reluctance to rely upon such
costs to invalidate the amendments. Id. at 874 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 851-52.
40. Id. at 851 (citation omitted).
41. Rotunda, The Doctrine of Conditional Preemption and Other Limitations on Tenth
Amendment Restrictions, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 289, 293 (1984); see 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
42. 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun referred to the major-
ity's distinguishing of Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 524 (1975). In Fry, the Court upheld
the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 (an "emergency" measure) as applied to the states
to temporarily freeze wages of state and municipal employees. Justice Rehnquist cited four
reasons why the situation in Fry was sufficiently different from that in National League of
Cities so as not to warrant overruling the case: (1) the need for the act was brought about by
an extremely serious problem that could be forestalled only by collective action by the fed-
eral government; (2) the interference would be short-lived; (3) the enactment would not
displace state choices of how to structure governmental operations; and (4) the enactment
19851
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Justice Brennan strenuously opposed the majority's opinion,
urging that it repudiated settled principles governing judicial in-
terpretation of the Constitution.43 In a federalist system, he rea-
soned, restraints upon the commerce power lie in the political pro-
cess, not in the judicial process. 44 The federalist nature of
Congress, consisting of representatives from the states, assures
that Congress normally considers the effects of federal regulation
upon the states before displacing state authority.45 Justice Bren-
nan stressed that effective restraints on Congress' exercise of its
commerce power "'must proceed from political rather than from
judicial processes,' ",46 because the Constitution does not provide
for any judicially-imposed restraint upon state sovereignty.47 He
considered the majority's opinion a hollow abstraction without
constitutional or precedential basis, which merely reflected displea-
sure with congressional judgment.4 8
Justice Brennan suggested that the logical extension of the ma-
jority's reliance on the tenth amendment as an express limitation
on Congress' enumerated powers would overrule not only Mary-
land v. Wirtz, 49 but earlier decisions reaching back to McCulloch v.
Maryland.50
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, did not question that the
federal government's power over the labor market embraced state
employees. He was as confounded as Justice Brennan by the ma-
jority's "traditional governmental functions" test and confessed he
could not identify a limitation on federal power that would not
also invalidate an unquestionably permissible federal regulation of
state activities. Stating that he did not agree with the wisdom of
the 1974 amendments, he nonetheless affirmed that it was a policy
issue which had been resolved by the branch having power to de-
reduced, rather than increased, pressures upon state budgets. Id. at 853.
43. 426 U.S. at 857 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 876-77.
45. Id. at 858 n.2 (citations omitted).
46. Id. at 876 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942)).
47. 426 U.S. at 858 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 860, 867-72.
49. 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled in 426 U.S. 833, 840 (1976)). In Wirtz, the Court
upheld the 1966 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, which had extended the
definition of "employer" to include state hospitals, institutions, and schools.
50. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See 426 U.S. at 859, where Justice Brennan quotes
from the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405-06: "The govern-
ment of the United States, then, though limited in its powers, is supreme; and its laws, when
made in pursuance of the constitution, form the supreme law of the land, 'any thing in the
constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.'"
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cide such issues51
The Court's decision in National League of Cities breathed new
life into the tenth amendment and transformed it into an affirma-
tive limitation on Congress' power under the commerce clause.
Just how this new precedent was to be followed, however, led to
confusion in the lower federal courts. Two conflicting approaches
to invalidation of suspect federal legislation were presented. The
majority's test asked whether the legislation would impinge upon
an "essential state function," but gave little guidance for identify-
ing such functions other than a list of traditional areas of state and
municipal involvement such as fire and police protection, sanita-
tion and public health services, and maintenance of parks and rec-
reation facilities.52 A further ambiguity concerned the measure of
impingement necessary to compromise the principles of federalism.
Justice Rehnquist considered the degree of federal interference
with integral governmental functions of the states to be irrelevant;
the dispositive question was whether Congress had exercised its
commerce clause authority in an area affecting the states as
states." The Court, seemingly reluctant to apply such an absolute
standard, did not use the tenth amendment to invalidate federal
legislation in the eight years following National League of Cities.5
Lower courts avoided Justice Rehnquist's test and chose to adopt
the balancing approach articulated by Justice Blackmun in his
concurring opinion. 55
III. National League of Cities AS PRECEDENT
A. Avoiding the Reach of National League of Cities
The National League of Cities decision was severely criticized
by both the academic and the judicial communities . However, ap-
prehension that National League of Cities heralded a new wave of
states-right's federalism soon proved unfounded as subsequent ju-
dicial interpretations limited the purview of the decision, reducing
it to "a very carefully worded opinion on a very narrow issue. ' '57
In a footnote to National League of Cities, Justice Rehnquist
51. 426 U.S. at 881 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 851.
53. Id. at 851-52.
54. Rotunda, supra note 41, at 291.
55. Id. at 294.
56. Id. at 295.
57. EEOC v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 503 F. Supp. 1051, 1053 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
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suggested that Congress might be able to regulate essential state
functions by exercising its authority granted under the spending
power, or under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.58 Within a
week of the National League of Cities decision, Justice Rehnquist,
confirming the implications of that footnote, rendered an opinion
which recognized that under the fourteenth amendment Congress
was empowered to enforce the anti-discriminatory employment
prohibitions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against the
states as employers. 9 In 1980, the Court decided City of Rome v.
United States0 and Fullilove v. Klutznick,1 reaffirming the no-
tion that when Congress acts under the Civil War Amendments, it
may intrude into all areas of state autonomy.6 2 In those cases, Na-
tional League of Cities was considered irrelevant because it dealt
solely with Congress' commerce clause powers; federal action under
the fourteenth amendment avoided such "complications." s
Justice Rehnquist was equally correct in believing that federal
legislation enacted under the spending power could permissibly
impinge upon essential state functions. Following National League
of Cities, lower federal courts continued to uphold such acts of
congressional intrusion in situations where the states had a choice
whether to participate in federally funded programs. 4
In a 1983 decision, the Supreme Court unanimously removed
congressional actions under the spending power from the control-
ling influence of National League of Cities. Justice O'Connor au-
thored the opinion and stressed that the states involved had volun-
tarily committed to the grants-in-aid programs and had provided
assurances that they would abide by the federal regulations. Thus,
the states were bound to repay any funds not used as agreed. "Re-
quiring States to honor the obligations voluntarily assumed as a
condition of federal funding . . . simply does not intrude on their
sovereignty."' 5
58. 426 U.S. at 852 n.17; see Alfange, Congressional Regulation of the "States Qua
States": From National League of Cities to EEOC v. Wyoming, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 215, 247.
For a discussion of Congress' ability to affect state sovereignty under the Civil War Amend-
ments, see id. at 220-226, 247-249.
59. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
60. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
61. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
62. Alfange, supra note 58, at 222.
63. Id. at 247-48.
64. See Rotunda, supra note 41, at 296 n.44 (listing cases). Professor Rotunda notes that
the state's " 'choice' is often illusory because the federal 'bribe' is so large." Id. at 296.
65. Bell v. New Jersey, 103 S. Ct. 2187, 2197 (1983).
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In a 1980 criminal case involving bribery and racketeering
charges against a state legislator, the Court held that evidence re-
lating to the accused's official legislative activities could permissi-
bly be introduced in a federal trial because the prosecution was of
an individual, not a state." One commentator saw this as a regula-
tion of the states as states: "for the states can act only through the
official actions of their officials, and the official actions of legisla-
tures . . . are the sum of the actions of the individual legisla-
tors. 10 7 The Court's unwillingness to extend the "doctrine [of Na-
tional League of Cities] to analogous cases," he concluded, "is
itself evidence that the doctrine is of questionable validity. '6 8
. The tenth amendment may not preclude application to the
states of legislation enacted under Congress' commerce clause
power where the states are acting in a proprietary capacity by com-
peting in the private retail market.6 9 Justice Powell, writing for the
majority in Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Association v. Abbot
Laboratories, reasoned:
In one important sense, retail competition from state agencies can
be more invidious than that from chain stores .... [T]o the ex-
tent that lower prices are attributable to lower overhead, result-
ing from federal grants, state subsidies, free public services, and
freedom from taxation, state agencies merely redistribute the bur-
den of costs from the actual consumers to the citizens at large."0
B. Supreme Court Refinements of the National League of
Cities Doctrine
One of the most commonly encountered criticisms of the Na-
tional League of Cities decision centered on the frustration it
caused the judicial community: The opinion simply did not pre-
scribe a test for determining whether a state function was pro-
66. United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980).
67. Alfange, supra note 58, at 248-49.
68. Id. at 249.
69. Jefferson County Pharm. Ass'n v. Abbot Laboratories, 103 S. Ct. 1011 (1983). Retail
pharmacists brought an antitrust action against pharmaceutical manufacturers, a county
hospital, and trustees of the University of Alabama, charging price discrimination in viola-
tion of the Robinson-Patman Act. The Supreme Court ruled that if state purchases for
consumption and traditional governmental functions are to be exempt from the Act under
the tenth amendment, those purchases might only be protected on a case-by-case basis. Id.
at 1014 n.6.
70. Id. at 1017 n.17.
1985]
288 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:277
tected from federal legislation enacted under the commerce clause.
Clear guidance was not provided by indistinct phrases such as "the
activities of the States as States,' 71 "functions essential to [the
states'] separate and independent existence, ' 7 or "integral opera-
tions in areas of traditional governmental functions. 73
The Court first attempted to clarify this baffling imprecision in
terminology in two companion cases decided in the 1981 Term:
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association,74
and Hodel v. Indiana.7 5 In these cases, associated coal mining in-
terests brought several preenforcement challenges to the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,7 which created a
national system for regulating surface coal mining and reclamation
of land following the cessation of mining activity. Federal district
courts in Virginia77 and Indiana,7 s in addition to finding constitu-
tional transgressions among certain other of the Act's provisions,
found the land reclamation provisions to be in contravention of the
tenth amendment. Relying on National League of Cities, the court
for the Western District of Virginia framed the issue as whether
the Act governed the activities of private individuals or instead
regulated the governmental decisions of the states.7 9 While admit-
ting the Act's ultimate effect was on the coal mine operator, the
court concluded that the Act impermissibly interfered with the
states' "traditional governmental function" of regulating land
71. 426 U.S. at 842.
72. Id. at 845 (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911)).
73. 426 U.S. at 852. See Comment, National League of Cities Crashes on Takeoff: Bal-
ancing Under the Commerce Clause, 68 GEO. L.J. 827, 836 n.60 (1980) for the full litany of
formless language used by Justice Rehnquist to describe state activities which are immune
from federal regulation under the commerce power.
74. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
75. 452 U.S. 314 (1981). Hodel v. Indiana and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Rec-
lamation Ass'n are hereinafter referred to collectively as Hodel.
76. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982). According to the Court, the purpose of the Act was to
protect society and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining opera-
tions. 452 U.S. at 268. Implementation was to be in two stages. Congress mandated that in
the initial phases the environmental protection performance standards under the Act were
to be immediately promulgated and enforced. The subsequent, permanent phase mandated
adoption of a regulatory program for each state. A state wishing to assume permanent regu-
latory authority over its surface coal mining operations was required to submit its own pro-
gram (which necessarily incorporated the environmental protection standards of the Act) to
the Secretary of the Interior for approval. Otherwise, the federal government would design a
program for the state. 452 U.S. at 268-71.
77. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va.
1980), modified, 452 U.S. 264, vacated, 453 U.S. 901 (1981).
78. Indiana v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. Ind. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
79. 483 F. Supp. at 432.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
use." The Supreme Court rejected this conclusion by relying on
the supremacy clause.81 The reclamation provisions did not regu-
late the state as states but, instead, regulated the private activities
of coal mine operators, an area affecting interstate commerce over
which the power of Congress is "supreme and exclusive." 2
Were it not for National League of Cities, Justice Marshall,
writing for a unanimous Court, could have put down his pen at this
point. However, being obligated to dispel the cloud of confusion
obscuring the tenth amendment issue at the lower federal court
level, he stated that the district court's holding rested on an un-
warranted extension of the decision in National League of Cities.
Justice Marshall announced a three-pronged test to determine
when federal legislation under the commerce clause violated the
tenth amendment:
First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute regu-
lates the "States as States." Second, the federal regulation must
address matters that are indisputably "attribute[s] of state sover-
eignty." And third, it must be apparent that the States' compli-
ance with the federal law would directly impair their ability "to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions.
83
Even if a statute were to satisfy all three requirements, a tenth
amendment challenge might still fail if the situation were such
that the federal interest advanced justified state submission. This
condition has become known as the "fourth prong" of the Hodel
test and is derived from Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Na-
tional League of Cities.4 Thus, the balancing approach, which had
won instant favor with the lower federal courts following National
League of Cities, gained unanimous Supreme Court acceptance.8 5
Examining the Surface Mining Act in light of these require-
ments, the Court found it unnecessary to go beyond the first prong
of the test. The tenth amendment challenge failed because the
statute did not regulate the states as states.86
80. Id. at 435 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852).
81. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
82. 452 U.S. at 290 (quoting Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Stroud, 267 U.S. 404, 408 (1925)).
83. Id. at 287, 288 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845, 852, 854).
84. 452 U.S. at 288 n.29; see 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
85. See Rotunda, supra note 41, at 294 n.30 (listing decisions in which lower courts em-
ployed the balancing approach).
86. 452 U.S. at 288.
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The following Term, in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
v. Mississippi,87 the Court went a step beyond Hodel to uphold
federal legislation of a far more invasive nature.8 The dispute in
Hodel arose after Congress gave the states the option of creating
and adopting plans for the regulation of surface mining or of hav-
ing the federal government preempt their authority in the area and
create one for them. The enactment challenged in Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, however, gave the states the choice of ei-
ther considering the federal government's proposals or of aban-
doning regulation of the field altogether.8 9 This case involved a
tenth amendment challenge to the Public Utilities Regulatory Pol-
icies Act of 1978 (PURPA), legislation designed to enlist the aid of
the states in conserving energy resources.90 PURPA requires the
states to entertain federal rate and regulatory standards91 and to
follow public notice and hearing procedures if they choose not to
adopt the proposals.92 To encourage the development of alternative
energy sources and small power production facilities, Congress
promulgated certain rules in PURPA which the states were re-
quired to implement.9 This was the most intrusive provision and
the one which the Court found troublesome. 4
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, distinguished National League of Cities,
stating that the Court there considered "the extent to which state
sovereignty shields the States from generally applicable federal
regulations" while in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission the
issue concerned the federal government's attempts to use "state
regulatory machinery to advance federal goals.19 5 Therefore, the is-
sue presented was one of first impression for the Court. This could
explain the Court's reluctance to apply the Hodel test, despite
other similarities between the two cases, and its reluctance to de-
cide the issue on supremacy clause grounds. Because Congress
clearly could have preempted the field, at least insofar as private
87. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
88. Id. at 764.
89. Id. at 766, 781.
90. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15, 16, 30, 42, 43 U.S.C.).
91. PURPA § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 3203 (1982).
92. PURPA § 113, 16 U.S.C. § 2623 (1982). For a detailed explanation of the plan, see
456 U.S. at 745-50.
93. PURPA § 113, 16 U.S.C. § 2623 (1982).
94. 456 U.S. at 759.
95. Id. at 758-59.
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activity was concerned, Justice Blackmun reasoned: "PURPA
should not be invalid simply because, out of deference to state au-
thority, Congress adopted a less intrusive scheme and allowed the
States to continue regulating in the area on the condition that they
consider the suggested federal standards.""
The more troublesome provision of PURPA, which comman-
deered state administrative agencies to implement federal stan-
dards, was not so neatly dispatched by the Court. Justice Black-
mun concluded that because acts similar to those required of the
state under PURPA were already being carried out by state ad-
ministrative and judicial bodies it would be no imposition upon the
state to handle matters arising under PURPA 97 The Court de-
clared that the obligation of state officials to enforce federal law
rested squarely on the supremacy clause98 and that, in certain cir-
cumstances, the federal government may structure the states' exer-
cise of their sovereign powers. "9
The Court's first opportunity to consider the third prong of the
Hodel test arose earlier in the 1982 Term when it reviewed United
Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road.100 The case arose
when collective bargaining under the Railway Labor Act (RLA)'01
between a state-owned passenger railroad and a railroad employ-
ees' union reached impasse. The State of New York had acquired
the Long Island Rail Road some thirteen years earlier, after 132
years of private ownership. Following a pleading battle waged in
the lower state and federal courts, strike intercession by the Presi-
dent of the United States, and a transmutation of the railroad en-
tity from a private stock company to a public benefit corporation,
the case reached the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit.102
96. Id. at 765 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
97. Id. at 760-61.
98. Id. (citing Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947)).
99. 456 U.S. at 764 n.28.
100. 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
101. Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 577 (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188
(1982)).
102. 455 U.S. at 680-82. Following the failure of efforts of the National Mediation Board
to settle the dispute, the Board released the case, which triggered a 30-day cooling-off pe-
riod under the RLA. In anticipation that the state would challenge the applicability of the
RLA, the union filed suit one day before the end of the cooling-off period in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York seeking a declaratory judgment
that the dispute was covered by the RLA and not by the Taylor Law, a state law prohibiting
strikes by public employees. The next day, the union commenced a strike. Pursuant to the
RLA, the President imposed an additional 60-day cooling-off period. Prior to the expiration
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The court of appeals overruled the district court, employing
both the definitional and the balancing tests of National League of
Cities. It held that the operation of the railroad was an integral
state governmental function and that the RLA had displaced "es-
sential governmental decisions" involving that function. 10 3 The
Court, on balance, held that the state's interest in controlling the
operation of its railroad outweighed the federal interest in apply-
ing the Act.'"" The Supreme Court disagreed.
In a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, the
Court found that the railroad's claim failed to pass the third prong
of the Hodel test which examines whether "the State['s] compli-
ance with the federal law would directly impair [its] 'ability to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions.'105
The Court's review of the RLA revealed nearly a century of com-
prehensive federal regulation of railroads. The Act had fulfilled its
purpose of preventing disruptions in rail service by facilitating col-
lective bargaining between railroads and labor organizations repre-
senting railroad employees. 08 Also, the operation of passenger rail-
roads, as well as freight railroads, has traditionally been a function
of private industry, not of state or local governments.10 7 Recent
state acquisition of some passenger railroads was not accepted by
the Court as altering the "historical reality" of federal regulation
in the field.108
Even though the Court insisted that its emphasis on tradition
was "not meant to impose a static historical view of state functions
generally immune from federal regulation," a narrowing of the
traditional state function is perceived. 09 Dicta in the case presup-
poses that the Court would not permit the individual states, "by
of the 60-day period, the state, in an attempt to circumvent the coverage of the RLA, con-
verted the railroad from a private stock corporation to a public benefit corporation. The
railroad then filed suit in state court to enjoin the impending strike under the Taylor Law.
But, before the state court could act, the federal district court granted the union's suit for
declaratory relief, holding that the railroad was subject to the RLA and not to the Taylor
Law.
103. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 634 F. 2d 19, 24-29 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd,
455 U.S. 678 (1982).
104. Id. at 29-30.
105. 455 U.S. at 684 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287-88 (quoting National League of
Cities, 426 U.S. at 852)).
106. 455 U.S. at 688.
107. Id. at 686.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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acquiring functions previously performed by the private sector, to
erode federal authority in areas traditionally subject to federal
statutory regulation."110
Not only did the state's interest in regulation of its passenger
railroad fail to qualify as a traditional governmental function
under the third prong of the Hodel test, but also the state's knowl-
edge and acceptance of the RLA's regulation of its railway opera-
tion during the thirteen years of state ownership estopped the
state from claiming that federal regulation impaired its traditional
state sovereignty."'
The Court's most recent attempt to interpret National League
of Cities prior to Garcia was EEOC v. Wyoming.'1 2 This case arose
when a Wyoming state game warden, who had been forced by stat-
ute13 to retire at age fifty-five, filed a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging violation
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)." 4 The
Commission then filed suit in federal district court seeking a de-
claratory judgment that Wyoming was engaged in unlawful em-
ployment practices. The district court dismissed the complaint.
The court first decided that since ADEA had been enacted under
the commerce clause, the proper precedent was National League
of Cities. Moreover, it held that, under the doctrine of tenth
amendment immunity as set forth in that case, the Act could not
be applied constitutionally to the state.11 5
The case was appealed directly to the Supreme Court. The
Court, with Justice Brennan writing for a five-Justice majority, re-
versed, holding that Congress was justified under its commerce
clause power in applying the ADEA to the states." 6
The state's challenge to the application of the ADEA to it was
not based on the theory that Congress had overstepped its powers
110. Id. at 687. For a discussion of the history of federal regulation of railroads, see id. at
687-89.
111. Id. at 690.
112. 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983).
113. 103 S. Ct. at 1059. A Wyoming statute provided that certain law enforcement of-
ficers could continue working past age 55 only with the approval of the department, and
that no one could continue working beyond age 65. WYo. STAT. § 31-3-107 (1977) (current
version at Wyo. STAT. § 9-3-607 (1985)).
114. U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
115. EEOC v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595, 600 (D. Wyo. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1054
(1983). Additionally, the district court held that the ADEA could not be upheld under the
fourteenth amendment since Congress had not expressly acted under this power. Id. at 600.
Had the court ruled otherwise the state would possess no immunity.
116. 103 S. Ct. at 1064.
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under the commerce clause, but rather, that the tenth amendment
acted as an affirmative restraint barring Congress' direct applica-
tion of the ADEA to the states. 11 7 Responding to this argument,
Justice Brennan stated that the principle of immunity which
emerged in National League of Cities was a functional doctrine
that allowed the states to effectively perform certain core state
functions, but "whose ultimate purpose [was] not to create a sa-
cred province of state autonomy. '1 18
Justice Brennan's analysis focused on the third prong of Ho-
del.119 Accepting from National League of Cities that the opera-
tion of state parks was a traditional state function, 20 the Court
explained that the impairment of a state's ability to structure inte-
gral operations was judged as a matter of degree.12 ' The Court
found that the degree of intrusion in EEOC as compared to that in
National League of Cities was considerably less serious. The
state's asserted purpose of assuring that Wyoming game wardens
be physically prepared to perform their duties would not be
thwarted by the enforcement of the ADEA. The state could assess
the job qualification of preparedness through physical examina-
tions. Moreover, if the state could demonstrate that a particular
level of physical fitness was a bona fide occupational qualification
for the job of game warden, the state could continue to discharge
older wardens on the basis that they failed to meet the standard.
The Court did not believe that a state's costs would necessarily be
increased by implementation of the ADEA. 22 Although it would
cost the state more to keep the older wardens on the payroll be-
cause their salary levels would presumably be higher than the level
at which the state might employ younger wardens, these costs to
the state would be recouped in the pensions not paid while those
workers remained employed and the fewer years for payment fol-
lowing retirement.12 3 Consequently, the Court held that the ADEA
did not sufficiently intrude on the state's ability to "structure inte-
gral operations.' ' 2
4
117. Id. at 1060.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1060-62; see supra note 105 and accompanying text.
120. 103 S. Ct. at 1062 (citation omitted).
121. 103 S. Ct. at 1062 (citations omitted).
122. Id. at 1062-63.
123. Id. at 1063.
124. Id. at 1062. The Court suggested that even if the state's interest had survived the
three prongs of the Hodel test, it would have been outweighed by the federal interest in the
ADEA. Id. at 1064 n.17.
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Justice Stevens cast the swing vote and joined the Court's opin-
ion; he also authored a concurring opinion denouncing the founda-
tion of the majority's decision. He censured the majority for having
construed the commerce clause too narrowly. In maintaining that
the commerce clause embodies the central purpose of the Constitu-
tion, he asserted that the need for centralized regulation of inter-
state commerce prompted the drafting of the instrument. 12 5 Be-
cause regulation of the labor market was clearly within the purview
of that central purpose, the only question in Justice Stevens' mind
was whether that purpose envisioned control over the public as
well as over the private sector of employment. He discussed the
interdependence of those segments of the economy and the tre-
mendous growth of public employment, concluding that for Con-
gress to achieve any effectiveness in the labor field it must regulate
both public and private employment.12 6
Accordingly, Justice Stevens concluded that tenth amendment
limitations upon Congress' commerce clause power could not exist
under the Constitution. 27 He viewed the National League of Cit-
ies decision as "pure judicial fiat," an exercise in policy- making
which properly belonged to Congress and called for its reversal.' 28
III. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority
A. The Decision of the Federal District Court
On November 21, 1979, Joe G. Garcia and fellow employees of
the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA)
brought an action against their employer for overtime pay under
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).12 9 On that same date,
SAMTA filed an action for declaratory judgment against the Sec-
retary of Labor, styled San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity v. Donovan, seeking a determination that SAMTA was exempt
from the provisions of the FLSA.130 SAMTA moved for summary
125. Id. at 1064-65 (Stevens, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 1068.
127. Justice Stevens stated, "I think it so plain that National League of Cities not only
was incorrectly decided, but also is inconsistent with the central purpose of the Constitution
itself, that it is not entitled to the deference that the doctrine of stare decisis ordinarily
commands for this Court's precedents." Id. at 1067.
128. Id.
129. Jurisdictional Statement at 4 n.5, Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1005. That suit was stayed
pending disposition of the constitutional challenge in SAMTA's suit. Garcia was granted
leave to intervene as a defendant, and the American Public Transit Association was allowed
to intervene as a plaintiff.
130. Id. at 4.
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judgment in the Garcia action, asserting that, under National
League of Cities' the FLSA could not constitutionally be applied
to it. In the alternative, it argued that the decision precluded en-
forcement of the FLSA against any state or local governmental
body in the absence of a congressionally enacted and constitution-
ally valid amendment to that Act.'32
On November 17, 1981, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas granted summary judgment for
SAMTA, finding that it performed a traditional state function and
was thus immune under the tenth amendment of the Constitution
from the minimum wage and overtime pay provisions of the
FLSA. 13
The Secretary of Labor and Garcia each filed a direct appeal to
the Supreme Court. While those appeals were pending, the Su-
preme Court decided United Transportation Union v. Long Island
Rail Road."4 Consequently, the Court vacated the district court's
decision and remanded San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Au-
thority v. Donovan for reconsideration in light of Long Island Rail
Road. On remand, the district court re-entered summary judgment
in favor of SAMTA.135
The district court in Donovan was not persuaded that Long Is-
land Rail Road compelled a different conclusion in San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Donovan. The court relied on
National League of Cities, in which the Supreme Court had de-
cided that the tenth amendment prohibited the use of commerce
clause power "to force directly upon the states [Congress'] choices
as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral gov-
ernmental functions are to be made."' 36 The district court recog-
nized that even after the Long Island Rail Road decision identify-
ing a sovereign state function remained difficult,137 despite the fact
that the Court had indicated that at least three factors need to be
considered: historical reality; other factors indicating that a func-
tion is presently a basic state prerogative; and, in the case of activ-
ities recently converted from the private sector to public ownership
131. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
132. Jurisdictional Statement at 4, Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1005.
133. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445, 446 (W.D. Tex.
1983), rev'd sub nom. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
134. 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
135. 557 F. Supp. at 446-47.
136. Id. at 447 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 855).
137. 557 F. Supp. at 447.
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and operation, a court must consider the history and scope of fed-
eral regulation to determine whether the conversion would imper-
missibly erode long-standing federal authority.'38
Even after evaluating San Antonio's transit system within these
parameters, the district court remained unswayed and held fast to
its original determination. The court concluded from a record of
Texas regulatory activity dating from 1913 that mass transit had
traditionally been a state prerogative and responsibility. Texas'
election to leave ownership and operation in private hands and to
manifest its interest through the regulation of fares, franchising,
insurance, and safety requirements "[did] not negate the inference
of sovereignty that arises from history."' 3 9
In considering the third prong of the Long Island Rail Road
test, the court acknowledged that the history of both mass transit
in general and of SAMTA in particular' included recent conver-
sions from private to public ownership."' However, unlike Long
Island Rail Road, where the federal statute in question, the Rail-
way Labor Act (RLA),4 2 was merely a recent sequel to a long line
of federal statutes regulating railway labor relations, the FLSA had
specifically exempted transit operators from its coverage.' 3 It was
only in 1961 that private transit operators were covered under the
138. Id.
139. Id. at 448.
140. Publicly owned transit has existed in San Antonio since 1959 when the City of San
Antonio acquired the San Antonio Transit Company. The city's purchase was financed by
revenue bonds. No federal funds were involved in the acquisition.
In its Act of May 21, 1973, ch. 141, 1973 TEx. GEN. LAWS 302 (codified as amended at TEx.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 1118x (Vernon Supp. 1985)), the Texas legislature authorized the
establishment of metropolitan rapid transit authorities and provided that such authorities
constituted "public bod[ies] corporate and politic, exercising public and essential govern-
mental functions." TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1118X § 6(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
SAMTA was created on February 3, 1977. It was financed by the levy of a 1/2 % sales tax and
through the issuance of bonds. No federal funds were used in the purchase. SAMTA began
operations on March 1, 1978. See Appellee's Motion to Affirm at 6-7, Garcia, 105 S. Ct.
1005.
Since its establishment, SAMTA has received substantial federal financial assistance
under the Urban Mass Transportation Act (UMTA), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1618 (1982). During
the first two years of operation, Congress provided grants under the UMTA totaling $12.5
million, an amount equal to 30% of SAMTA's total operating expenses during that two-year
period. From December 1970 through February 1980, SAMTA and its predecessors received
$51,689,000 in federal grants, the equivalent of 40% of their total eligible project costs. See
Brief for Secretary of Labor at 8-9, Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1005.
141. 557 F. Supp. at 448-49.
142. Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 577 (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188
(1982)).
143. 557 F. Supp. at 449.
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FLSA, and it was not until 1966 that the Act was applied to public
transit operators.144 It would be difficult to find a long-standing
federal regulatory scheme that would be eroded by a grant of tenth
amendment immunity in light of the short time the statutes have
been in existence. 145
Defendants Garcia and Donovan argued that a grant of tenth
amendment immunity to SAMTA from the wage and overtime pay
provisions of the FLSA would impair the impact of other federal
statutes affecting the transit company. The court examined several
federal statutes and was not convinced that any diminution of fed-
eral regulatory authority would follow such a grant.
Much of the legislation in question, such as the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), 46 which has generally governed labor rela-
tions for private transit companies since its enactment in 1935,
contains either statutory or judicial exceptions for state and local
governments as employers. 147 Other statutes merely invite rather
than mandate state compliance. The Urban Mass Transportation
Act of 1964 (UMTA)," 48 for example, is an exercise of the spending
power that conditions the imposition of federal regulation upon
voluntary compliance by the states. The states must meet the fed-
eral government's standards in order to continue to receive federal
funding.'49
Absent any erosion of federal statutory power, the court found
implicit authority in Long Island Rail Road for granting tenth
amendment immunity to current governmental functions which
had been private functions in the past. The court stated that to
hold otherwise "would impose precisely the 'static historical view
of state functions' that LIRR eschews."'150
The Donovan court was convinced that the state's prerogatives,
when viewed from the perspective of historical reality, constituted
decisionmaking in the conduct of an integral state function. First,
the court analogized the operation of local mass transit to the
traditional functions of states recognized in National League of
Cities: fire protection, police protection, sanitation, public health,
144. Id. (citation omitted).
145. Id.
146. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
147. 557 F. Supp. at 449.
148. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1618 (1982).
149. Id. § 1609.
150. 557 F. Supp. at 449 (quoting United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S.
678, 686 (1982)).
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and parks and recreation. The court stressed that this nonexclusive
list was among the "'numerous line and support activities whidh
are well within the area of traditional operations of state and local
governments.' 151 The court noted that the only state function
specifically taken off the list was the operation of a commuter rail-
road. By analogy, state-owned transit systems that perform identi-
cal services to railway systems should not be exempt from the
FLSA. However, according to the court, Long Island Rail Road
commands that, because of the absence of a history of federal regu-
lation in the field, bus systems must be distinguished from railroad
lines.15 1
The district court emphasized the difficulty it had in articulating
an adequate basis upon which to distinguish public transit from
the functions enumerated in National League of Cities. The court
recognized that in a recent case, Kramer v. New Castle Area
Transit Authority,153 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that public transit was not entitled to tenth amendment im-
munity on the basis of the large amount of federal funding made
available pursuant to UMTA. 156 The Donovan court, however,
found the level of federal funding to be an unsatisfactory distinc-
tion for three reasons. First, it is an exercise of the spending power.
Second, federal funding also supports each of the National League
of Cities functions. Third, federal funding is an unreliable guide-
line because of the flux in funding to the states based on changing
political demands.1 55
The Donovan court's final test for tenth amendment immunity
was to evaluate SAMTA's operation under the four factors set out
in Amersbach v. City of Cleveland:56 (1) whether the function
151. 557 F. Supp. at 449 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851 n.16) (em-
phasis in original).
152. 557 F. Supp. at 451 n.6.
153. 677 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1982).
154. 557 F. Supp. at 451.
155. Id. at 452.
156. 598 F.2d 1033, 1037 (6th Cir. 1979). The Amersbach court found that the municipal
operation of an airport was a traditional function because of the importance of air travel
and because public ownership was the most expedient method of providing the service. The
court also noted that only two of the country's 475 airports serving municipal areas were
privately owned. Id. at 1038 n.7. The court rejected the employees' argument that the opera-
tion of a municipal airport is a proprietary rather than a governmental function and should
therefore be subject to federal regulation under the commerce clause.
The Supreme Court, in Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978), rejected the
governmental-proprietary distinction as untenable. One commentator contends that the
Amersbach test is flawed under the National League of Cities balancing approach because
it focuses exclusively on the interests of local governments and does not examine the federal
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benefits the community as a whole and is made available at little
or no direct expense; (2) whether the function is undertaken for
public service rather than pecuniary gain; (3) whether government
is the principal provider of the function; and (4) whether govern-
ment is particularly well suited to perform the function because of
a community-wide need.1 57 The court decided that SAMTA's oper-
ation easily qualified as a traditional governmental function under
this test. Curiously, the funding considerations, which were ineffec-
tual to establish a federal interest in the field of local mass transit,
became determinative in the court's evaluation of state and local
government involvement. The court stressed that public transit
was heavily subsidized by local tax revenues in order to augment
revenues from nominal fares that amounted to about twenty-five
percent of operating expenses. Massive federal grants were not
weighed in the court's analysis.'58
The Donovan court concluded that Long Island Rail Road did
not command that it overrule its prior decision. Based on historical
reality and other factors, the court found that mass transit was
clearly a state prerogative and tenth amendment immunity from
the challenged FLSA provisions would not erode existing federal
powers because authority in the area of transit employment had
long rested with the state and local governments. 59
B. The Decision of the Supreme Court
Contemporaneously, the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits decided cases with fact patterns parallel to that
of Donovan but held that application of the FLSA's overtime pay
requirements to local public transit employees did not violate the
tenth amendment. 160 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
interests involved. Comment, supra note 73, at 827, 828 n.9.
157. 598 F.2d at 1037.
158. 557 F. Supp. at 453-54.
159. 557 F. Supp. at 454.
160. The Sixth Circuit, in Dove v. Chattanooga Area Regional Transp. Auth., 701 F.2d
50 (6th Cir. 1983), noted that federal planning and funding went into the creation of the
Authority in 1971, and that the federal government's role had continued to be extensive.
While agreeing with the view of the Supreme Court in Long Island R.R. that the notion of
what is traditional is not a static concept,.the court stated that it would be peculiar to hold
that a traditionally private service which became a public service due to federal aid was
immune to federal labor regulations. Id. at 53.
The Eleventh Circuit, in Alewine v. City Council of Augusta, 699 F.2d 1060 (11th Cir.
1983), relied upon an analogy of Augusta's bus system to the commuter railway service in
Long Island R.R. The court found that bus service historically has been a private enterprise.
The court stated further that the "probability that private companies are 'doomed to ex-
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recently employed the Amersbach test in a suit by highway con-
struction workers against their employer, the Puerto Rico Highway
Authority. The court found that the Authority was engaged in a
traditional governmental function because road building and main-
tenance benefit the community as a whole, and because the public
considers government best suited to provide this service due to the
community-wide impact of highway systems. 61 Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority was selected by the Su-
preme Court to resolve this discord.
The question originally argued before the Supreme Court in
Garcia was "May minimum wage and overtime provisions of FLSA
constitutionally be applied to employees of a publicly owned and
operated mass transit system? '"1 2 The Court, however, set the case
for reargument in the October 1984 Term on a question of much
broader constitutional significance: "Whether or not the principles
of the tenth amendment as set forth in National League of Cities
v. Usery .. .should be reconsidered."' 6
Upon reargument, the Department of Labor claimed that the
doctrine underlying National League of Cities was harmonious
with the fundamental principles of federalism embodied in the
Constitution, but that the district court's ruling should be reversed
because public transit is not a "traditional governmental func-
tion.""64 The Department stressed that public ownership of mass
transit systems is a recent development spurred by massive federal
aid. It further contended that "It]he power to make policy judg-
ments is probably the quintessential attribute of sovereignty-but
no less an essential attribute for Congress." 165 Were SAMTA's
wage and hour decisions left to the "unfettered control" of the city,
they would have just the same effect on interstate commerce as the
decisions of private transit operators. 6 6 The Department sup-
ported retention of the traditional function test because it is a
means of accommodating the competing interests of the state and
federal governments. 67
tinction,' thus requiring local governments to shoulder the burden abandoned by the private
sector" does not automatically turn the service into a traditional function. Id. at 1069 (quot-
ing Kramer v. New Castle Area Transp. Auth., 677 F.2d 308, 310 n.1 (1982)).
161. Molina-Estrada v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 680 F.2d 841, 845-46 (1st Cir. 1982).
162. 52 U.S.L.W. 3013 (U.S. July 19, 1983).
163. 53 U.S.L.W. 3184 (U.S. Sept. 25, 1984).
164. 53 U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1984).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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In its argument, SAMTA contended that "constitutional federal-
ism" and the tenth amendment limit Congress' power to regulate
state and local governments under the commerce clause.16 8 In sup-
port of the assertion that public transit is a traditional governmen-
tal function under National League of Cities, SAMTA reported
that 100 of 106 major urban centers across the country have pub-
licly-owned mass transit systems and that ninety-six percent of
commuters nationwide use public transit systems.16 9 SAMTA con-
cluded its argument by stating that the principle of constitutional
federalism implicit in the Constitution makes it clear that the
states must have a separate and independent existence, and that
the role of the judiciary is to determine whether the federal gov-
ernment is "devouring" the states' authority. 17 0
SAMTA employee Joe Garcia urged the Court to overrule Na-
tional League of Cities and to affirm Congress' power under the
FLSA to regulate the hours and wages of employees of states and
their political subdivisions.171 Garcia argued that the propositions
underlying that decision were entirely alien to the system of gov-
ernment envisioned by the framers of the Constitution. He agreed
that both the federal and state governments were intended to pos-
sess sovereign authority but contended that the propositions ad-
vanced by the Supreme Court in National League of Cities to sup-
port this premise were misconceived. The Court argued that first,
federal sovereignty was intended to be subject to subordination by
state sovereignty and second, the judiciary was vested with a com-
mission to invalidate legislation which it viewed as unduly intru-
sive on state sovereignty.17
168. Id. at 3256.
169. Id.
170. Id. This statement was made in reply to a question from Justice Stevens as to
which branch the framers intended to assume this responsibility-the federal judiciary or
Congress. Id. The expression "devour" derives from Justice Douglas' dissent in Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 204-05 (1968):
If constitutional principles of federalism raise no limits to the commerce power
where regulation of state activities are [sic] concerned, could Congress compel the
States to build super-highways crisscrossing their territory in order to accommo-
date interstate vehicles, to provide inns and eating places for interstate travelers,
to quadruple their police forces in order to prevent commerce- crippling riots,
etc.? Could the Congress virtually draw up each State's budget to avoid "disrup-
tive effect[s] . . . on commercial intercourse."?
If all this can be done, then the National Government could devour the essen-
tials of state sovereignty . . ..
(Citation omitted.)
171. 53 U.S.L.W. 3256 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1984).
172. Brief of Appellant on Reargument at 4-5, Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1005.
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In support of his position, Garcia drew upon the text of the Con-
stitution, the debates at and surrounding the constitutional con-
vention, the Federalist Papers, the debates preceding the ratifica-
tion of the tenth amendment, and Supreme Court precedent
dating from McCulloch v. Maryland.' 73 He stated that the purpose
of the constitutional convention was to create a national govern-
ment with supremacy over the governments of the several states.
Having suffered the "gloomy consequences" of weak federal gov-
ernment under the Articles of Confederation, the framers decided
"to draw a line of demarkation (sic) which would give to the Gen-
eral Government every power requesite (sic) for general purposes,"
and to establish federal supremacy within those enumerated pow-
ers.' 74 Nor, Garcia continued, was there anything in the tenth
amendment intended to alter this understanding or to abridge any
power granted to Congress. The legislative history of the amend-
ment clearly establishes that its purpose was to quiet the fears of
the anti-federalists that rights not expressly reserved to the people
would be incidentally relinquished to the central government-not
that its purpose was to restrict any powers granted under the Con-
stitution, whether express or implied. 175
Prior to National League of Cities, the principle that "[t]he sov-
ereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary
as to those objects," had guided the Court throughout its history,
with one exception. For a period of approximately twenty years
ending in 1941 during which the Court appeared reluctant to sanc-
tion pro-labor legislation, the Court construed Congress' commerce
clause power narrowly.'7 6
In 1941, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Darby,177 re-
turned to its earlier expansive reading of the commerce clause
power and held as misplaced any reliance upon the tenth amend-
ment as an independent limitation on congressional power over in-
terstate commerce. The tenth amendment was stated to be but a
truism that all is retained that has not been surrendered. 178 Where
federal authority exists it is supreme, and the safeguard for state
sovereignty lies in the political, not the judicial process. These
173. Id. at 4-12 (citations omitted).
174. Reply Brief of Appellant on Reargument at 6, Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1005 (quoting THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 356, at 132 (J. Madison) (Farrand ed. 1911).
175. Reply Brief of Appellant on Reargument at 8, 11-12, Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1005.
176. Id. at 14-15.
177. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
178. Id. at 124.
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principles have prevailed in the Court's decisions concerning the
scope of Congress' commerce clause power, maintained Garcia.
"National League [of Cities] represented a sharp departure from
these precedents. '179
Garcia's arguments proved to be persuasive. On February 19,
1985, the Supreme Court held that the tenth amendment does not
place an affirmative limitation upon Congress' power under the
commerce clause to extend the FLSA's minimum wage and over-
time protections to state and local employees and therefore over-
ruled its decision in National League of Cities.
In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Blackmun and joined by
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens, the Court reex-
amined the standards for establishing state immunity from federal
regulation developed in National League of Cities and subsequent
cases and held that, in practice, the standards led to conflicting
results.'80 Justice Blackmun affirmed that undoubtedly there are
limits on the federal government's power to interfere with state
functions but they do not reside in a priori definitions of state sov-
ereignty.1 8' He stated that protection for the states' "residuary and
inviolable sovereignty" rests in the structural protections of the
Constitution itself. 82 The majority concluded that the validity of
these structural protections was exemplified by congressional treat-
ment of public mass transit. In each instance, as FLSA obligations
were imposed upon the states, they were balanced with extensive
funding through the UMTA. 83
In revisiting National League of Cities and its progeny, the Su-
preme Court focused upon the seemingly simple but intractable
"traditional function" standard. Under this standard, a federal
statute transgressed tenth amendment guarantees if state compli-
ance directly impaired the state's ability "to structure integral op-
erations in areas of traditional governmental functions.' 1 84 Fur-
179. Brief of Appellant on Reargument at 12, Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1005.
180. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1007, 1010-12. The Court listed a number of lower federal
court decisions wherein courts struggled to distinguish immune state functions from unpro-
tected state functions and concluded: "We find it difficult, if not impossible, to identify, an
organizing principle that places each of the cases in the first group on one side of a line and
each of the cases in the second group on the other side." Id. at 1011.
181. Id. at 1016.
182. Id. at 1017-18 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 285 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed.
1961)).
183. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1020.
184. Id. at 1011 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452
U.S. 264, 287-288 (1981) (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854).
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thermore, the Court found this standard to be "not only
unworkable but . . . inconsistent with established principles of
federalism. 185
The function standard defied definition. To sound a "cautionary
note" against the assumption that continued case-by-case develop-
ment would lead to a workable standard, the Court related the his-
tory of a similar definitional problem in the area of state immunity
from federal taxation. Forty years of tax decisions had failed to
formulate criteria to identify state governmental functions that
were entitled to immunity.18" In the tax area, the judiciary had at-
tempted to draw the line between "governmental" and "proprie-
tary" functions, subjecting the latter to federal tax under the the-
ory that a state divested itself of its sovereignty when it took on
the character of a trader and entered the marketplace seeking cus-
tomers.18 However, this distinction proved impracticable. At-
tempting to determine the bounds of congressional power by cate-
gorically separating "governmental" from "proprietary" state acts
resulted in anomalies such as the federal government's taxing the
income of an officer of a state-owned transportation system while,
at the same time, exempting from taxation the manager of a mu-
nicipal waterworks. 88 Finally, in 1946, a unanimous Supreme
Court abandoned the distinction as untenable. 189
In judicial attempts to protect definitionally important state
functions from federal reach in the areas of intergovernmental tax
immunity and commerce clause regulation, Justice Blackmun saw
more than a problem of phraseology. He stated that any distinc-
tion that purported to separate out important governmental func-
tions could not be "faithful to the role of federalism in a demo-
cratic society."1 90 States must be free to experiment within the
realm of authority left open to them under the Constitution. Any
rule of state immunity that looks to the "'traditional,' 'integral,' or
'necessary' nature of governmental functions inevitably invites an
unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state
policies it favors and which ones it dislikes."1 91
The Court declared that when congressional authority was being
185. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1007.
186. Id. at 1012-13.
187. Id. at 1013 n.7.
188. Id. at 1013.
189. Id. (citing New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946)).
190. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1015.
191. Id.
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measured under the commerce clause, the states' protection from
federal overreaching did not lie in the judiciary's evaluation of the
nature of a particular state function or in any other freestanding
conception of state sovereignty. Insulation of state interests lay in
the structure of the federal government itself.192
The Court emphasized that the framers of the Constitution had
given the states a role in the selection both of the executive and
the legislative branches of the federal government. 193 James
Madison had placed particular reliance on the states' equal repre-
sentation in the Senate, which he stated as being "at once a consti-
tutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the
individual States, and an instrument for preserving that residuary
sovereignty."19' This democratic infrastructure, the Court inferred,
was proof of the framers' intent that state autonomy be preserved
by procedural safeguards inherent in the federal system rather
than by judicially created limitations on federal power.1 95
To demonstrate the effectiveness of these constitutional safe-
guards, the Court cited the states' historic and continuing ability
to obtain federal grants while at the same time exempting them-
selves from federal obligations imposed under the commerce
clause. Among the examples given were the Federal Power Act, the
National Labor Relations Act, and the Sherman Act.19e The devel-
opment of public mass transit bears out this claim. Employing
their appreciable power to influence legislation, the states have
managed to balance impositions of the provisions of the FLSA
with corresponding federal funding through the UMTA.1 97
The Court "perceive[d] nothing in the overtime and minimum-
wage requirements of the FLSA, as applied to SAMTA, that [was]
192. Id. at 1018.
193. Id. (citing U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2; art. II, § 1).
194. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1018-19 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 408 (J. Madison)
(B. Wright ed. 1961)). The majority acknowledged that there have been changes in the
structure of the federal government since 1789, including the substitution of popular elec-
tion of senators through the adoption of the seventeenth amendment in 1913. However, it
maintained that:
[T]he fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on the Com-
merce Clause to protect the "States as States"'is one of process rather than one of
result. Any substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must
find its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation, and it must
be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national political process
rather than to dictate a "sacred province of state autonomy."
Id. at 1019-20 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236 (1983)).
195. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1018.
196. Id. at 1018-19.
197. Id. at 1020.
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destructive of state sovereignty or violative of any constitutional
provision." '198 It concluded that the majority in National League of
Cities had underestimated "the solicitude of the national political
process for the continued vitality of the States." Attempts in that
decision to contain Congress' commerce clause power over state
functions through affirmative limits were unnecessary. "In sum, in
National League of Cities the Court tried to repair what did not
need repair."1 99
Generally reluctant to overrule recent precedent, the Court
stated that it did not hesitate to do so "when it has become appar-
ent that a prior decision has departed from a proper understanding
of congressional power under the Commerce Clause." National
League of Cities represented such a departure. The decision was
held to be doctrinally and operably irredeemable and was
overruled. 0
Three dissenting opinions were filed in Garcia. Justice Powell
wrote a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Burger, Justices
Rehnquist and O'Connor joined. Justice O'Connor wrote an opin-
ion joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist. Justice Rehnquist
wrote a very short opinion that was not joined by any other mem-
ber of the Court.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Powell strongly criticized the
Court's reasons for overruling National League of Cities and its
rejection of judicial review of federalism issues in commerce clause
legislation. He thought the Court misunderstood the intention of
the framers of the Constitution.0 1 Justice Powell contended that
the majority incorrectly characterized the mode of analysis estab-
lished in National League of Cities and developed in subsequent
cases.20 2 In his view, those cases did not engage in or require a pre-
cise definition of "traditional governmental functions." Rather,
those decisions followed the balancing approach Justice Blackmun
discerned in the National League of Cities opinion and explained
in his concurrence to that decision. Under the balancing approach,
federal power would not be outlawed where the federal interest
was demonstrably greater than that of the state and where state
compliance with the challenged legislation was essential.20
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1021.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1021-33 (Powell, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 1023-24.
203. Id. at 1024 (citing National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856).
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Justice Powell viewed the Court's "precipitous overruling of
multiple precedents '20 4 as less serious, in the long run, than its al-
teration of the "federal system embodied in the Constitution.""2 '
By removing the states' recourse to judicial review of challenged
commerce clause legislation, he argued that the states will be left
to the mercy of political decisions made by members of the federal
government. Thus, the members of Congress, when acting under
the commerce clause, would become the sole judges of the limits of
their own power.2 6 Such a result, according to Justice Powell, ig-
nores the teaching of Marbury v. Madison that it is the duty of the
federal judiciary to determine the law where a congressional stat-
ute is at odds with the Constitution. 0 7
Stating that the tenth amendment performs an integral role in
our constitutional theory concerning the balance between state and
federal powers, Justice Powell asserted that the Court erred in its
interpretation of the legislative history surrounding the Constitu-
tion. The framers evinced strong concerns that provision be made
for the explicit reservation of powers to the states. Had the Feder-
alists not consented to include the tenth amendment in the Bill of
Rights, Justice Powell claimed they would not have been able to
secure the necessary votes for ratification of the Constitution.20 8
The Court's sweeping holding did more than resolve the issue in
the case before it. Justice Powell feared that, "[in] overruling Na-
tional League of Cities, [the] opinion apparently authorizes federal
control, under the auspices of the Commerce Clause, over the
terms and conditions of employment of all state and local
employees. "209
Justice Powell then applied the tests of National League of Cit-
ies to the facts of Garcia. The balancing test could only weigh in
favor of the compelling state and local government interests. He
maintained that "displacing their control over wages, hours, over-
time regulations, pensions, and labor relations with their employ-
ees could have serious, as well as unanticipated, effects on state
and local planning, budgeting, and the levying of taxes. '210
204. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1022.
205. Id. at 1021.
206. Id. at 1026.
207. Garcia 105 S. Ct. at 1026-27 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177
(1803)).
208. Id. at 1027-28, 1027 n.15.
209. Id. at 1032.
210. Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In conclusion, Justice Powell employed the test he had earlier
criticized the Court for mischaracterizing in the National League
of Cities line of cases. He had inferred that the Court's inability to
find an "organizing principle" 211 among decisions designating vari-
ous functions as traditional governmental functions was due to its
erroneous interpretation of such holdings as "blanket pronounce-
ments that particular things inherently qualified . . . or did
not." 2 By analogy to the provision of such services as street main-
tenance, public lighting, traffic control, and water and sewage sys-
tems, Justice Powell reasoned that the operation of an intracity
mass transit system was a classic example of a traditional govern-
mental function. 13 This conclusion appears to have been based
upon the just-denounced inherent qualification standard. Since
Justice Powell provided no further explanation for this result, it is
difficult to divine whether his reliance was misplaced or whether
the passage is merely opaque and thus susceptible of misinterpre-
tation. Services protecting citizens' health and safety are those
with which state and local officials are intimately familiar and for
which they are accountable to their electorate. It naturally follows
that locally-elected representatives would be more responsive to
such needs than would federal bureaucrats. Justice Powell stated
that this is the nature of state and local control that "the Framers
understood would insure the vitality and preservation of the fed-
eral system that the Constitution explicitly requires." '21 4
Filing a separate dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor explained
her fundamental disagreement with the majority's views of federal-
ism and the role of the Court. 21 5 She asserted that, in overruling
National League of Cities, the Court had so narrowed the range of
states' power under the Constitution that the central issue of fed-
eralism became whether there remained any area in which a state
might act free of federal interference.1 6 She also criticized the ma-
jority for its retreat from the conflict between the Constitution's
dual concerns for federalism and an effective commerce power.21 7
Justice O'Connor stated that, due to the emergence of an inte-
grated and industrialized national economy, the powers of Con-
211. Id. at 1011.
212. Id. at 1023 n.4.
213. Id. at 1032.
214. Id. at 1032-33.
215. Id. at 1033 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
216. Id.
217. Id.
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gress have been dramatically expanded beyond the vision of the
framers of the Constitution.218 Therefore, it becomes important to
realize that the framers perceived a narrow commerce power which
would be used primarily to remove interstate tariffs and to regu-
late maritime affairs and large-scale mercantile enterprises. Justice
O'Connor did not suggest that the commerce power should be as
narrowly construed today, but contended that this historic percep-
tion explains why the framers believed "the Constitution assured
significant state authority even as it bestowed a range of powers,
including the commerce power, on the Congress. '219 Justice
O'Connor continued, stating that, as a national economy emerged,
it was necessary for the Court to more broadly interpret the com-
merce power of Congress to enable the federal government to deal
with economic problems that were national in scope. Today, Con-
gress may regulate intrastate activities that affect interstate com-
merce as well as commerce among the states. In order to regulate
an activity, Congress need only demonstrate a rational basis for
finding that the activity affects interstate commerce. Even if an
individual's activities do not perceptibly affect interstate com-
merce, those acts may be brought under the reach of the commerce
clause through regulation of that class of activity as a whole as
long as that class affects interstate commerce.220 As a result, Jus-
tice O'Connor stressed, virtually every state activity, in addition to
every private activity, affects interstate commerce. Combined with
changes in the workings of Congress such as the direct election of
senators and the advent of national interest groups, the diminution
of state authority over commerce represented by the Court's rejec-
tion of National League of Cities presents "a real risk that Con-
gress will gradually erase the diffusion of power between state and
nation on which the Framers based their faith in the efficiency and
vitality of our Republic. ' '221
Justice O'Connor, in conclusion, stated that the majority's rea-
soning was inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution in that
it did not "[weigh] state autonomy as a factor in the balance when
interpreting the means by which Congress can exercise its author-
ity on the States as States.122 2 Furthermore, "[tihe spirit of the
Tenth Amendment. . . is that the States will retain their integrity
218. Id. at 1034.
219. Id. at 1035.
220. Id. at 1035.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1037.
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in a system in which the laws of the United States are nevertheless
supreme. 2 3
In a brief dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist stated that Jus-
tice Powell's reference to the tests in National League of Cities
and Justice O'Connor's balancing solution were not "precisely con-
gruent with Justice Blackmun's views in 1976, when he spoke of a
balancing approach that did not outlaw federal power in areas
'where the federal interest is demonstrably greater.' ",224 Nonethe-
less, any of these approaches, he stated, would affirm the judgment
in this case.
Justice Rehnquist concluded that it was not necessary for the
dissenters to spell out the fine points of a principle that would "in
time again command the support of a majority of [the] Court."225
V. ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF FEDERALISM
The majority's narrow victory in Garcia and the portent of Jus-
tice Rehnquist's statement make it apparent that questions of fed-
eral regulatory power over the states are still very much in dispute
and that the philosophies which underlie both National League of
Cities and Garcia are of continuing relevance.
Commentators have found it no easier to reach agreement in this
area than have the Justices. Many proposals for protecting federal
and state sovereignty interests have been advanced. Although most
scholars suggest tests for balancing these powers to achieve a work-
able joint-sovereignty relationship, some have advocated establish-
ing sanctuaries wherein particular governmental powers may be
held inviolate.
Professors Tribe and Michelman, in support of state sovereignty,
propose securing a state's ability to provide social services from the
reach of federal regulation. Professors Choper and Alfange support
federal supremacy in economic regulation and would allow judicial
review only in defense of individual rights. Professor La Pierre
would allow judicial intervention to protect state decision-making
in extraordinary situations where Congress could not be held polit-
ically accountable for its acts but would rely on political safeguards
inherent in the constitutional system in ordinary situations. Pro-
fessor Rotunda advocates withdrawing cases of conditional federal
preemption of state sovereign authority from the field for dispute
223. Id. at 1036 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
224. Id. at 1033 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
225. Id.
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of federalism issues. Professor Nagel argues that proper considera-
tion of federalism issues demands an intellectual ability to appreci-
ate the indeterminate. "Indeterminate" is the watchword in light
of the Court's decision in Garcia. A sampling of the range of feder-
alism philosophies follows. Any one or more of these interpreta-
tions could influence the Court when it again considers the extent
of congressional regulatory authority over the states.
A. In Defense of Abstractness
Professor Nagel, whose work was cited in the dissenting opinion
of Justice O'Connor in Garcia, has defended the Court's decision
in National League of Cities for its abstractness, although others
have denounced the decision for that same reason. He insists that
the decision is understandable and admirable when viewed from
the proper intellectual perspective. He contends that the decision
requires analysis of basic structural principles of federalism. These
are abstract concepts, according to Nagel, that the framers in-
tended would maintain a system of power allocation over long peri-
ods of time. Nagel reasons that conclusions of law based upon
these principles were not easily made operative.22 Nagel explains:
"Many jurists and scholars tend to envision constitutional values
mainly in terms of individuals' rights and to undervalue judicial
protection of principles that allocate decision-making responsibil-
ity among governmental units. ' 227 This approach leads to an in-
strumentalist inclination to use law to accomplish tangible changes
in the world.2 2 8 "The [National League of Cities'] Court . . . em-
phasized the abstract concept behind the principle of federalism; it
spoke of states as being 'coordinate elements' [needing] 'separate
and independent existence.' "229 Nagel argues that this language
does not require a tangible static system of power allocation. This
was made clear in National League of Cities by the fact that the
Court refused to rest its decision on any specific measure of the
burden imposed on the states by the FLSA. s°
Professor Nagel's concern is that the frame of mind created by
protracted concentration on the direct protection of individual
rights "does not easily appreciate the less determinate require-
226. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in Perspec-
tive, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 81, 108.
227. Id. at 87.
228. Id. at 94.
229. Id. at 98 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 849, 851).
230. Nagel, supra note 226, at 98.
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ments of constitutional structure" and that a body of law develop-
ing in such a system will not fairly represent the full range of the
framers' concerns.23 1
B. The Social Justice Argument
Justice Brennan characterized the majority's holding in Na-
tional League of Cities as a portent "so ominous for our constitu-
tional jurisprudence as to leave one incredulous. '23 2 Other mem-
bers of the judiciary and many constitutional law scholars agreed
that National League of Cities had "precipitated extraordinarily
broad and severe criticism and comment."2 33 However, National
League of Cities' has been given a surprisingly generous interpre-
tation by at least two constitutional law scholars, Professors Tribe
and Michelman.' Professor Tribe argues that the decision rested
not on the tenth amendment but on the Court's desire to protect
individual rights to state-provided services.235 Furthermore, he sees
in the opinion the beginnings of a doctrine that the states have an
affirmative constitutional obligation to provide essential govern-
mental services to their citizens. Professor Michelman admitted
that this interpretation of National League of Cities seems to lead
in directions not intended or anticipated by the Justices. '
Professor Michelman observes that certain services of state and
local governments are raised to "essential" status by the electorate
when voters conclude that such services, even if available in the
private sector, satisfy community needs and ought to be provided
collectively. 37 Such a theory, he suggested, might explain why Na-
tional League of Cities' protection from congressional interference
should be restricted to governmental suppliers of services.2 38 How-
ever, this public sentiment might emanate from motives less wor-
231. Id. at 109.
232. 426 U.S. at 875 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
233. Rotunda, supra note 41, at 295. For a list of commentators expressing concern that
the Court was returning to its earlier unprincipled handling of limitations on federal com-
merce power, see id. at 291 n.9, 295 n.38. See also Comment, supra note 15, at 625, 625 n.2
(suggesting that such a torrent of criticism casts doubt upon the validity of the National
League of Cities holding).
234. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative
Rights to Essential Governmental Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977); Michelman,
States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cit-
ies v. Usery, 86 YAE L. J. 1165 (1977).
235. Rotunda, supra note 41, at 293 n.27 (citation omitted).
236. Michelman, supra note 234, at 1166.
237. Id. at 1177.
238. Id.
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thy than that social justice demands provision of the service. In
such cases there could be little argument that congressional inter-
ference would merit judicial intervention. But without further in-
vestigation, there is no way of discerning the motives of the electo-
rate. Any determination by the Court to intervene would therefore
reflect its own belief that such social justice factors are involved.239
Professor Michelman saw the Court in National League of Cities
as ascribing to the states a role" of "satisfying social justice con-
cerns that the Court ranked ahead of whatever interests were
served by allowing Congress to proceed with the FLSA amend-
ments . . . . [The attribution of this role] could only have been a
morally creative judicial act implying recognition of inchoate per-
sonal rights. '2 0
C. The Balancing Approach
Other commentators, taking a less moral perspective, have been
unwilling to accept Justice Rehnquist as a champion of individual
rights. They have focused instead on his analysis and have dis-
cerned a balancing of federal and state interests in the state em-
ployment arena. Notwithstanding Justice Rehnquist's insistence
that the degree of federal imposition upon state operations was not
crucial to the resolution of the issue,241 the decision seems to de-
mand weighing the competing interests involved. The definitional
approach advanced by Justice Rehnquist failed because no criteria
were set out with which to evaluate inclusion or exclusion from the
"integral governmental function" category.
The true precedential value of the decision seems to have been
derived from the Court's treatment of Fry v. United States.242 Not
prepared to overrule Fry, the Court distinguished away its signifi-
cance by employing the very balancing of federal regulatory and
state autonomy interests it denied espousing.24 3
One commentator recognizes a "kind of definitional balancing"
in the opinion. This would require determining which side most
239. Id. at 1188.
240. Id. at 1189-90 (emphasis in original). National League of Cities, in essence, is "a
case in which congressional action that seemed to carry a substantial risk that some persons
would be denied certain services is for that reason subjected to special judicial scrutiny-or,
in other words, .. receipt of those services was treated as a right." Id. at 1190 (emphasis
in original).
241. 426 U.S. at 846, 851.
242. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
243. 426 U.S. at 852-53.
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closely fits the category and should thus prevail. For example, the
state would prevail where the definition of "interstate commerce"
would be unduly strained were it stretched to include the state ac-
tivity in question."
Another commentator argues that, in practice, the Court re-
treated from Justice Rehnquist's "rigid per se test" in National
League of Cities, and implemented the balancing test advanced by
Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion.24 5 In Justice Black-
mun's test, federal and state interests are weighed to determine
whether federal legislation should give way to a state's tenth
amendment claims.21 6 The commentator observes that Justice
Rehnquist's test would have required the Court in Hodel to con-
sider only whether the state's interest was an essential state func-
tion. The Hodel Court instead used the first prong of the three-
part test, which required a showing that the congressional enact-
ment regulated the states. This led the commentator to suggest
that the Court did not follow Justice Rehnquist's test.2 47
D. Conditional Preemption
Supreme Court cases following National League of Cities sug-
gest that very few aspects of state sovereign authority are immune
from federal control.24 8 The Court has upheld commerce clause leg-
islation that affects the states' freedom to structure integral opera-
tions in areas of traditional government functions despite the Na-
tional League of Cities decision. In Federal Energy Regulation
Commission v. Mississippi 249 and EEOC v. Wyoming250 the states
contested the imposition of federal programs which enlisted the co-
operation of state administrative and judicial agencies to imple-
ment federal regulations and which restructured state employer-
employee relationships. The Court deemed these permissible exer-
cises of congressional power because the federal laws did not fore-
close the states' ability to continue its operations in the federally-
regulated areas. Utilities regulation and labor relations are areas
that Congress may broadly preempt. Therefore, federal incursion
244. See Comment, supra note 73, at 847.
245. Note, National League of Cities v. Usery to EEOC v. Wyoming Evolution of a
Balancing Approach to Tenth Amendment Analysis, 1984 DuKE L.J. 601, 602.
246. Id. at 606.
247. Id. at 609.
248. Rotunda, supra note 41, at 307.
249. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
250. 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983).
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of a lesser nature which permitted continued state involvement
conditioned upon consideration of congressional proposals or re-
structuring of state employee retirement practices was not
improper.
A crucial distinction separates the conditional preemption cases
from National League of Cities. The 1974 amendments to the
FLSA did not provide for the alternative of federal preemption at
federal cost. The states were required to uphold the federal wage
and hour restrictions and to bear the cost of increased salaries.
The federal government imposed a massive burden on the states
without actually appropriating any federal funds. The National
League of Cities Court, in effect, held that this would endanger the
functioning of the state governments through the imposition of se-
vere fiscal and administrative costs.2 51 Conversely, in the subse-
quent cases,2 52 if the states chose not to assume the new burdens
imposed by federal law, the federal government would then pre-
empt the area and assume the costs of direct regulation. 53
The Court has conceded that, as a practical matter, the "choice"
afforded the states is sometimes illusory, and a state may often be
forced to acquiesce to the federal government's infringement of its
sovereignty. One commentator has identified a more troubling as-
pect of the "consent" approach: The Court has not defined the re-
quired nexus between the field which may be preempted and the
acts which Congress desires the states to perform. He posits that,
under a literal interpretation of Federal Energy Regulation Com-
mission v. Mississippi, Congress could have conditioned its non-
preemption of the field of public utilities upon a state's enacting a
statute to bring its police and fire fighters under the FLSA. "[Tihe
consent theory, if taken to its logical extreme, would create a sub-
stantial gap in the Usery rationale. '254
Professor Rotunda contends that the Court should follow the
doctrine of conditional preemption. He believes the doctrine "pro-
vides a principled justification for congressional exercises of the
commerce power" that might otherwise be interpreted as infring-
ing on the domain of state governments. 55
251. Rotunda, supra note 41, at 312.
252. E.g., Federal Energy Regulation Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 271-72 (1981).
253. Rotunda, supra note 41, at 312.
254. Note, supra note 245, at 601, 612-13.
255. Rotunda, supra note 41, at 324. Professor Rotunda dismisses the balancing ap-
proach as being fraught with opportunity to tempt jurists to impermissible activism. He sees
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E. Judicial Policy-Making
Among those commentators who view National League of Cities
as an "unfortunate and unjustified exercise in judicial review" is
Professor Alfange, an authority on American political history. Pro-
fessor Alfange accepts Justice Blackmun's analysis discerning a
balancing approach in National League of Cities. However, he
does not see the interests weighed as being the federal govern-
ment's concern for equalizing labor standards among state and pri-
vate employees on one side of the scale and the state's concern for
maintaining control over its fiscal reality on the other. Rather, he
contends that the Court was balancing policy considerations:
"[T]he judgment of constitutionality turn[ed] on the Court's as-
sessment of the wisdom, desirability, or necessity of the policy em-
bodied in the challenged law."25 He adds that had the Court
openly acknowledged its engagement in this process, it would have
been forced into a discussion of the factors being weighed which
would have greatly improved the coherence of the opinion. " 7
Whether it would have improved the constitutional propriety of
the opinion is another matter. Justice Stevens has argued that
such policy considerations are the province of the legislative
branch, not the judiciary.258 Because no question of individual
rights was at stake, Professor Alfange views the National League
of Cities dispute as "a proper case for the judicial self-restraint
endorsed by the Court since 1937 in the area of economic
regulation." 59
Professor Alfange concedes that the Court might have provided
protection for whatever degree of state autonomy was constitution-
nothing wrong with the "judicial technique of balancing interests to reach a decision when
the balancing leads to some definable rule or test." He states, however, that when such a
test fails to guide the lower courts, "we are left merely with ipse dixits by judicial Caliphs."
Id. at 322.
256. Alfange, supra note 58, at 241.
257. Id. For instance, Professor Alfange observes that one side of the balance was totally
ignored by the Court in National League of Cities-the importance of the federal govern-
ment's interest in controlling the wages of state and local government employees who at
that time constituted 12% of the national civilian work force. Id. at 241 n.150.
258. 426 U.S. at 881. See Justice Brennan's conclusion that the majority's reasoning "can
only be regarded as a transparent cover for invalidating a congressional judgment with
which they disagree." Id. at 872 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
259. Alfange, supra note 58, at 241. Professor Alfange finds that the classic statement of
Herbert Wechsler still applies: "Federal intervention as against the states is. . . primarily a
matter for congressional determination in our system as it stands." Id. at 242 (quoting
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composi-
tion and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 559 (1954))
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ally guaranteed by use of some standard, but not by an ad hoc
balancing of interests. 60 He states, "If such a [constitutional] stan-
dard can be articulated and defended, it may be applied in con-
crete cases without regard to the existence of the presidential veto
power or the influence possessed by the states in the national polit-
ical process."'2 6 1 In National League of Cities situations, where the
Court merely expresses a need to protect state autonomy, rather
than relying on a general rule, the measure of the states' influence
in the political process is critical. "For if the states can command a
serious hearing for their concerns, it is not a proper judicial func-
tion to reassess the outcome . . . to see whether it is desirable."
2 2
F. The Federalism Proposal
Professor Choper, whose work was cited by Justice Blackmun in
the Garcia opinion, embodies his argument for overruling National
League of Cities in his "federalism proposal." He believes that
"[lthe federal judiciary should not decide questions respecting the
authority of the national government over the states. Issues con-
cerning whether federal action violates states' rights should be
treated as nonjusticiable and relegated to the political branches of
the national government."'
Professor Choper contends that the primary justification for the
Supreme Court's exercise of judicial review is the protection of in-
dividual liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. The framers' es-
sential countermajoritarian rationale in adopting the Bill of Rights
was to safeguard the rights of individuals who could not be ex-
pected to prevail through the standard machinery of democratic
procedures.2 64 Judicial review of federalism issues, Choper argues,
is not as easily justified because "[n]umerous structural aspects of
the national political system serve to assure that states' rights will
260. Alfange, supra note 58, at 243-44.
261. Id. at 243.
262. Id. at 244.
263. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 175 (1980).
264. Id. at 64. Professor Choper states that the question of whether the framers origi-
nally intended to vest the Supreme Court with the power of judicial review is still un-
resolved by constitutional scholars. There is persuasive evidence in the debates of the First
Congress and in the Judiciary Act of 1789 that Congress intended the courts to be able to
pass on the constitutionality of federal and state governmental actions. Professor Choper
reasons that the reported evidence is inconclusive because during the nation's formative
years the doctrine of judicial review was not an accepted judicial tradition in either the
United States or abroad and because few of the framers held matured views on the subject.
Id. at 62-63.
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not be trampled, and . . . they have not been."26
There are various constitutional mechanisms which protect the
political interests of the states, including the states' equal repre-
sentation in the Senate and the selection of all congressmen
through state elections.26 Many congressmen have served as gover-
nors or in state legislatures prior to seeking federal election and
have "long, resolute, and intimate ties with their districts," which
may explain why they frequently choose to vote along regional
rather than along party lines.2 17
The role of the President in the political process is another pro-
tection for state concerns. Structurally, "the electoral college
places the separate states directly in a nominee's path to the White
House. '26 8 Candidates obligate themselves to local party organiza-
tions and state political leaders to obtain their influence in the
presidential nomination and election process. More importantly, to
remain effective in Congress, a President must remain attentive to
the states' interests.269
Choper asserts that the partiality of those who serve in nation-
ally elected offices leans to the side of localism, and experience
demonstrates that localism exists in many aspects of the political
process.27 Negative mechanisms of the constitutional process such
as bicameralism, the committee system, the filibuster, and the
presidential veto help ensure that legislation with any meaningful
effect upon state concerns is subject to searching scrutiny. 7 1
Historically, Congress and the Chief Executive have been solici-
tous of the federal system, Choper maintains. He states that the
immense growth of national programs over the history of the re-
public has not created a centralized autocracy. Generally, Congress
has "paid fastidious attention to the notion that certain govern-
mental powers are reserved to the states. 2 7 Illustrative of this as-
sertion are the prolonged constitutional debates that delayed pas-
sage of the Sherman Act and civil rights legislation, the concern for
local control over education accompanying each proposal of federal
financial aid, °and Congress' suspension of various Environmental
265. Id. at 176.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 178.
268. Id. at 179.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 188.
271. Id. at 185.
272. Id. at 186.
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Protection Agency regulations in 1975 because of strong criticism
advanced by state and local governments.2
Choper states that since Andrew Jackson's rejection of the Bank
of the United States, Presidents have rejected national legislation
they believed would intrude upon states' rights. Sensitive to the
financial needs of the states, they have directed federal funds to
the states through revenue sharing and federal grant-in-aid
programs.
2 74
Choper concludes that the Supreme Court should not adjudicate
constitutional questions of national power versus states' rights be-
cause cases of alleged federal over-reaching are presented to the
Court at a time when the legislation has already survived the fed-
eral political process; only after a broad consensus has been
achieved, despite negative elements which inhere in the system
and allow only a few state representatives to thwart the will of the
majority, can any proposal reach the status of law. 275
G. Political Accountability
Professor La Pierre, whose work was also cited in the opinion of
Justice Blackmun in Garcia, in his comprehensive study of the po-
litical safeguards of federalism, advocates reliance upon the politi-
cal process to determine the allocation of power between the states
and the national government-similar to the position taken by
Professor Choper.2 6 However, he challenges Choper's argument
that all federalism issues should be nonjusticiable because the
states' interests are secured through the structural protections in-
herent in the national political system. According to La Pierre,
Choper's approach would "permit the nation to swallow the
states". 7 7 "Deference to the political choices of the nation and re-
jection of the political choices of state political communities is war-
ranted only to the extent that Congress is politically
accountable. ,,278
La Pierre's theory makes Congress politically accountable to the
national electorate when political decisions are the product of a
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 187.
276. La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Im-
munity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 779, 789 (1982).
277. Id. at 977.
278. Id.
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national majority.2 79 Congress' accountability turns on political
checks built into the national political process. These checks are:
(1) the impact of national policy upon private activity, and (2) the
imposition of the costs of enforcing national policies upon the na-
tional electorate. 80 When Congress is politically accountable, in-
trusion upon state political decisionmaking is permissible. Con-
versely, when Congress is not politically accountable, the courts
should intervene to protect state interests in political
decisionmaking.281
Problems of federal usurpation of state political decisionmaking
arise when national regulations apply exclusively or primarily to
the states.2 82 When purely private interests are involved, Congress
becomes politically accountable for two reasons: (1) private parties
will hold their national representatives responsible for the impact
of the regulations, and (2) the cost of enforcing the federal policy
will be borne by the national electorate. When federal regulations
apply both to state and private interests, the states' interests are
vicariously protected by the impact of the regulations upon private
activities.
However, La Pierre contends, federal regulations or taxes that
apply exclusively or primarily to the states should be held invalid
because there would be no political checks. 283 He argues that there
are only two limitations on Congress' broad power to employ the
states as agents for the federal government. "Congress cannot sup-
plement state law, and Congress cannot mandate state enforce-
ment of national regulations. 2 84
Employing the theory of political accountability, La Pierre advo-
cated the overruling of National League of Cities because the stat-
ute at issue, the FLSA, applied both to public and private employ-
ers, thus invoking political checks on the national authority and
rendering judicial intervention unnecessary.285
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro-
politan Transit Authority effectively returned the tenth amend-
279. Id. at 1052.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1053.
282. Id. at 1054.
283. Id. at 1055.
284. Id. at 1056.
285. Id. at 1054.
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ment to the status described in United States v. Darby, a truism
that all is retained that has not been surrendered. Justice Powell
spoke more strongly in his dissenting opinion in Garcia, stating
that the majority's decision reduced the tenth amendment to
"meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the Com-
merce Clause." '286
In reaching its decision, the Garcia Court reexamined the hold-
ing in National League of Cities. That decision was originally per-
ceived to bar federal regulation of state functions on the constitu-
tional authority of a reinvigorated tenth amendment. However, in
the eight succeeding years, a doctrine evolved that so severely con-
strained the scope of the original decision that the opinion had lit-
tle import beyond its facts. Following EEOC v. Wyoming, the Na-
tional League of Cities test called for a two-step analysis
consisting of the application of the three-pronged Hodel test fol-
lowed by a balancing of the federal interest with the degree of a
statute's intrusion upon the state's ability to perform certain core
functions.
The major stumbling block, and the reason the test was so prob-
lematic in application, was that the third prong of the Hodel test
and the balancing analysis both rested upon the elusive definition
of a "traditional governmental function." The Garcia Court ex-
amined this "function" standard and decided that it was not only
unworkable but constitutionally deficient.2 87 The Court found the
"function" standard "inconsistent with established principles of
federalism" in that it drew the judiciary into deciding policy issues
which the framers of the Constitution had intended be settled by
debate on the floors of the legislative branch of the government.2 88
The Court's concern was that a test that could not dictate a rea-
sonably predictable result invited a judgment that might be based
not upon constitutional principles but upon an individual jurist's
parochial affiliations. The majority therefore concluded that judi-
cial review was inappropriate where Congress invoked its power
under the commerce clause to impose regulatory limits upon state
decisionmaking.
The federalism issue resolved in favor of the federal government
in Garcia is one that has sharply divided the Supreme Court for
eight years. In her dissent to the majority's opinion in Garcia, Jus-
286. 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1022 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting).
287. 105 S. Ct. at 1007.
288. Id.
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tice O'Connor compared this most recent eruption of the contro-
versy to a battle scene.289 This may prove an apt analogy.
The battle lines drawn by the members of the Court in 1976
have reappeared in Garcia. The intermittence of apparent concilia-
tory decisions seems not to have cooled the Justices' ardent de-
fense of their original positions.so Justice Rehnquist, in his dis-
senting opinion in Garcia, expressed his confidence that the
principles of National League of Cities would "in time again com-
mand the support of a majority of [the] Court."'2 9 If this prophecy
comes true, it may well be due to a change in the composition of
the Court rather than any change in the views of its current mem-
bers. If one or more members of the majority of the Court chooses
to retire before President Reagan's term expires, there is little
doubt that the sympathies of an appointee will rest with the mi-
nority. On the other hand, this certainty does not extend beyond
1988, for there is no guarantee that Reagan's policies of federalism
will survive his term, notwithstanding the party alliance of his suc-
cessor in office.
Nonetheless, there are avenues of change open to government
employers short of the Court's overruling Garcia. The fiscal impact
of the FLSA's wage payment, record-keeping, and reporting re-
quirements may be lessened by the flexibility inherent in the fed-
eral regulatory system. Of course, the Act may in time be modified
by congressional amendment, but immediate change will more
likely be effected through the Secretary of Labor's broad latitude
to promulgate regulations interpreting and directing implementa-
289. Id. at 1033 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
290. In National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 833, Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Rehnquist and Powell were among the majority. Justice O'Connor sounded her vigorous
defense of state sovereignty in a dissenting opinion in Federal Energy Regulation Comm'n v.
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982). Since Justice Blackmun, who provided the crucial fifth
vote in National League of Cities, joined that decision on his own terms by viewing the
holding as requiring a balancing of federal and state interests, it was difficult to divine his
allegiance.
A unanimous Court in United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982), did
not question the correctness of the principles of National League of Cities even though it
refused to apply them to a state-owned railroad. In EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054
(1983), the Court supported the federal agency's imposition of employment regulations
against the state. The majority in EEOC was composed of Justice Blackmun and the dis-
senters from National League of Cities: Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens. It
has been speculated that Justice Brennan, in writing for the Court in EEOC, chose not to
overrule National League of Cities, but rather to refine away its import in the hope that a
more politic stance would attract the necessary fifth vote of Justice Blackmun. Note, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wyoming, 22 DuQ. L. Rav. 995, 1013-14 (1984).
291. 105 S. Ct. at 1005, 1033 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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tion of the Act's provisions.2 92
The Garcia decision is rendered on two levels, the practical and
the theoretical. At this time, the practical ramifications of the deci-
sion are not entirely clear, and, although difficulties for govern-
mental employers will no doubt ensue in the short term, they are
not insuperable. On the other hand, at the theoretical level, the
fundamental issue of federalism remains unsettled. Even though
the majority's opinion clearly states that the structural safeguards
within the representative and executive branches are constitution-
ally sufficient to protect the states' sovereign interest when Con-
gress acts under its commerce power, four members of the Court
remain unconvinced, and would retain the Court's power of judi-
cial review in this area. Since the votes of only four Justices are
required for a grant of certiorari, it is likely that an appropriate
vehicle will soon appear to once again bring this question before
the Court.
292. Connor & Witkowski, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: Pub-
lic Employees Meet the FLSA, FLA. B.J., July/Aug. 1985, at 34.
